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Introduction
The multiple state taxation of income—the taxing of the same
increment of a particular taxpayer’s income by more than one state—
has long been considered constitutionally taboo.1 The reason is plain
enough. Such an overlap can only occur when a taxpayer is engaged in
income-producing activity in multiple states; taxpayers confining their
activity to a single state are necessarily immune. It logically follows
that such duplicative taxation, when it occurs, operates to the
disadvantage of taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce. And the
disadvantaging of interstate commerce, relative to purely intrastate

†

Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Many thanks to Michael
Asimow, David Ball, Colleen Chien, Deep Gulasekaram, Michelle Oberman,
Tyler Ochoa, Darien Shanske, David Sloss, Srija Srinivasan, and John
Swain for helpful comments along the way. All errors remain mine.

1.

By “taboo,” I do not mean necessarily unconstitutional. Indeed, elucidating
this distinction—between multiple taxation in general and multiple taxation
that presents a constitutional problem—is one of this article’s principal
objectives.

121

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
The States’ Multiple Taxation of Personal Income

commerce, is typically the sine qua non of a dormant Commerce Clause
violation.2
Unsurprisingly, then, many Supreme Court decisions have seemed
to proclaim that multiple taxation—or even just the risk of multiple
taxation—is constitutionally verboten. Consider the Court’s 1939
decision in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,3 where the Court
invalidated a state tax on the ground that it created, “merely because
interstate commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple burden to
which local commerce is not exposed.”4 Or consider the Court’s opinion
in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,5 where it
declared that a state may not “impose a tax which discriminates against
interstate commerce . . . by subjecting interstate commerce to the
burden of ‘multiple taxation.’”6 As the foremost expert in the field has
written, “[f]or more than 75 years, the Supreme Court has steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that the dormant Commerce Clause forbids
state taxes that expose interstate commerce to a risk of multiple
taxation to which intrastate commerce is not exposed.”7
But matters are not quite so simple. Despite these broad
pronouncements, the taxation of the same person’s income by multiple
states is often perfectly constitutional. And the Supreme Court has so
held, for reasons that are central to the states’ power to raise revenue—
an authority that is essential to their independent sovereignty.
First, it is firmly established that states have the power to tax any
income that is earned within their borders. If a taxpayer avails herself
2.

See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 574–75 (1997) (alteration in original) (“A State’s ‘power to lay and collect
taxes, comprehensive and necessary as that power is, cannot be exerted in a
way which involves a discrimination against [interstate] commerce.’” (quoting
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923))).

3.

305 U.S. 434 (1939).

4.

Id. at 439.

5.

358 U.S. 450 (1959).

6.

Id. at 458 (quoting Mich.-Wis. Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166
(1954)); see also Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct.
1787, 1794 (2015); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,
182 (1995) (referring to the dormant Commerce Clause’s “prohibition
against multiple taxation”).

7.

Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, 123
J. Taxation 1, 6 (2015) [hereinafter Deciphering Wynne]. See also Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation ¶ 4.09[1][a] (3d ed. 2020) [hereinafter
State Taxation] (“[A] tax that exposes a multistate taxpayer to the risk
of multiple taxation is invalid under the Commerce Clause.”). To be fair,
Professor Hellerstein has also written that “[t]his is not to suggest, however,
that the Constitution always forbids double taxation of income. In fact, it
does not.” Id. ¶ 6.04. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
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of the opportunity to engage in income-earning activity within a given
state, that state has jurisdiction to tax her income earned there.8 (This
is often called “source-based” tax jurisdiction.) But as the Supreme
Court squarely held in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,9 the
Constitution does not prescribe any uniform method for states to deter–
mine what income has been earned within their borders; it merely
requires that such determinations not be “arbitrary.”10 As a result, the
states’ income-attribution rules differ substantially from one another,
making overlap in the taxation of multistate taxpayers’ incomes
commonplace.11 And this multiple taxation, as the Court recognized in
Moorman, is entirely constitutional.12
Second, in addition to their source-based jurisdiction, states have
the power to tax all of the income of their residents, no matter where
the individual earns that income.13 This authority reflects a state’s
unique relationship with its citizens: the public services it provides, the
rights of citizenship it confers, and the protections it affords for the
enjoyment of that income.14 The existence of these two, independent
fonts of a state’s power to tax an individual’s income—on the basis of
source and residence—means that often two states will have the
authority to tax the same increment of income. And those taxing
powers are of equal constitutional status; the Constitution prescribes
no rule of priority between the state of source and the state of
residence.15 Hence, the foundations of the states’ constitutional powers
to impose personal income taxes inherently contemplate—even invite—
the existence of multiple taxation.16
8.

See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Tax’n, 322 U.S. 435, 441–42 (1944).

9.

437 U.S. 267 (1978).

10.

Id. at 275 (“The Iowa statute afforded appellant an opportunity to
demonstrate that the single-factor formula produced an arbitrary result in
its case. But this record contains no such showing and therefore the
Director’s assessment is not subject to challenge under the Due Process
Clause.”).

11.

See id. at 278–80 (discussing the fact that this sort of multiple taxation
is inevitable without mandatory, uniform rules for the division of income).

12.

See id. at 278.

13.

See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63
(1995); New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937);
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n of Miss., 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932).

14.

See Cohn, 300 U.S. at 313.

15.

See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.

16.

A point of clarification: for purposes of this article, I am setting aside the
question of whether states possess the authority to tax the entire income of
resident corporations, rather than the income reasonably attributable to the
taxpayer’s activity within the state. As others have noted, this remains an
open (and important) question. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
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Thus, the proposition that a state personal income tax that exposes
taxpayers to multiple taxation is unconstitutional for that reason is
untenable. No doubt, multiple taxation may point to an underlying
constitutional problem. An exaction is unquestionably impermissible
when it projects the state’s taxing authority beyond its lawful jurisdic–
tion, or when it discriminates against interstate commerce.17 And a tax
that violates one of these foundational prohibitions will often result in
duplicative tax burdens. But it is a conceptual mistake to confuse a
symptom for the underlying disease. Properly understood, multiple
taxation only indicates that a constitutional violation may be afoot, not
that one necessarily exists.
This clarification concerning the role of multiple taxation in assess–
ing the constitutionality of a state personal income tax is significant,
for it resolves an important question left unanswered by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v.
Wynne.18 There, the Court invalidated a provision of Maryland’s per–
sonal income tax that taxed Maryland residents on the entirety of their
incomes, wherever earned, without offering a credit for income taxes
paid to other states.19 (Maryland also imposed this same tax on nonresidents, on the income they earned within the state.20) Maryland’s
scheme necessarily exposed its residents who earned income outside the
state—when other states taxed that same income on a source basis—to
double state-level taxation.21
The first part of the Court’s analysis in Wynne invoked three
decisions invalidating state taxes that had subjected taxpayers to the

Curiae at 31, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787
(2015) (No. 13–485), 2014 WL 3811118 (noting that “[i]t is an open question
whether States are constitutionally required to apportion the income of a
domestic corporation”); State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 8.02[3]. There
are strong arguments that states have this power. But there are also decent
arguments that the relationship between a state and its individual (human)
residents is fundamentally different from what it has with business entities
domiciled in the state. And that difference might dictate a narrower
jurisdiction to tax a corporation’s income earned outside the taxing state.
In all events, the analysis presented in this essay is limited to personal
income taxes.
17.

Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805 (2015).

18.

135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).

19.

Id. at 1792.

20.

Id.

21.

See Bradley W. Joondeph, Opinion Analysis: Maryland’s Personal Income
Tax Violates the Commerce Clause, SCOTUSblog (May 19, 2015, 10:20
AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/05/opinion-analysis-marylandspersonal-income-tax-violates-the-commerce-clause/ [https://perma.cc/88Q
C-2YHC].
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risk of multiple taxation.22 Remarking that these cases were “particu–
larly instructive,” the Court seemed to intimate that tax schemes
producing this sort of “double taxation of income earned out of the
State” are necessarily unconstitutional.23 But the Court ultimately
grounded its holding in the conclusion that—viewing Maryland’s
scheme as a whole, as applied to both residents and nonresidents—it
discriminated against interstate commerce.24 And in doing so, the Court
reserved the question of whether the Constitution permits states to
impose nondiscriminatory personal income taxes on the entirety of their
residents’ incomes without protecting those taxpayers from the risk of
multiple taxation, disclaiming that it was establishing any “rule of
priority” for the state of source.25 The Court thus left undecided
whether such a scheme—which would necessarily expose taxpayers
engaged in interstate commerce to duplicative burdens not borne by
taxpayers confining their activities to one state—would violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.26
This article explains why it would not—why a state personal
income tax that exposes taxpayers to multiple taxation is entirely cons–
titutional so long as it neither projects the state’s taxing powers beyond
the state’s lawful jurisdiction nor discriminates against interstate
commerce.
Part I demonstrates that, contrary to the broad-brush generality
that the Constitution prohibits state income tax schemes that produce
multiple taxation, such schemes can be perfectly constitutional, giving
lie to the generality. Part II then explains that, though income taxes
that result in multiple taxation are frequently unconstitutional, the
reason is not the multiple taxation itself, but those schemes’ violation
of one of the two deeply embedded, foundational limits on states’ taxing
authority: (1) that states may only tax income over which they have
lawful jurisdiction; and (2) that states may not impose taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce. Finally, Part III illustrates
how this understanding of multiple taxation—disentangled from the
deeper principles that determine a state income tax’s consti–
tutionality—answers the question left open by Wynne. Specifically, a
state’s nondiscriminatory personal income tax on the entirety of its
residents’ income—absent any provision protecting taxpayers from
duplicative burdens stemming from other states’ taxing that same
22.

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (discussing J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U.S. 307 (1938), Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434
(1939), and Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)).

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 1805.

25.

Id.

26.

See Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that the Court’s
holding left this question open).
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income—is constitutionally permissible, despite the resulting multiple
taxation for taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce.

I. The Constitutionality of Multiple Taxation
A.

The “multiple taxation doctrine”

It is a well-worn general principle of state and local tax law that
the Constitution forbids state income tax schemes that expose
taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce to multiple taxation. Indeed,
though the Supreme Court has been somewhat inconsistent on this
point,27 many of the Court’s decisions have articulated the principle
that a state tax that subjects taxpayers to the risk of multiple taxation
(and not just actual multiple taxation) violates the dormant Commerce
Clause.28
This “multiple taxation doctrine” is often traced to the Supreme
Court’s 1938 landmark decision in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue.29 There, the Court upheld a New Mexico gross receipts tax
imposed on a newspaper’s revenue from out-of-state advertisers (dis–
pensing with the formalistic rule that states may not impose taxes
“directly” on interstate commerce).30 But in so holding, the Court
explained that a state tax would violate the Commerce Clause if it
subjected taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce to duplicative tax
burdens. States are forbidden from imposing taxes
of such a nature as to be capable, in point of substance, of being
imposed or added to with equal right by every state which the
commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being
27.

Compare Gwin, White & Prince, 305 U.S. at 439 (invalidating a state tax
because “it imposes upon [interstate commerce], merely because interstate
commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple burden to which local
commerce is not exposed”), with Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,
276 (1978) (rejecting the taxpayer’s dormant Commerce Clause challenge
in part because the “record does not establish the essential factual predicate
for a claim of duplicative taxation” where the existence of “duplicative
taxation of the net income” was “speculative”).

28.

See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, 305 U.S. at 439; J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).

29.

303 U.S. 250 (1938); see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 181–82 (1995) (noting that Justice Stone’s opinion in Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue has “since become our aspiration in this
quarter of the law”); State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 4.09[1][a] (noting
that Justice Stone was the “chief architect of the multiple taxation doctrine”
in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue).

30.

Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254 (“It was not the purpose of the
commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their
just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the
business.”).

126

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
The States’ Multiple Taxation of Personal Income
done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it
would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce.31

Less than three months later, the Court invoked this principle in
J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen to invalidate an Indiana gross
receipts tax.32 The Court reasoned that, “as applied to receipts from
interstate sales,” Indiana’s tax “includes in its measure, without
apportionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate com–
merce.”33 As such, the tax was imposed on revenue that could be taxed
“by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they
are manufactured.”34 The tax therefore subjected interstate commerce
“to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not
exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.”35
Likewise, in both Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford36 and
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealy,37 the Court invalidated state
taxes on the ground that, in taxing 100% of revenue also taxable by
other states, they impermissibly subjected taxpayers to the risk of
multiple taxation. In Greyhound Lines, the Court struck down a New
York gross receipts tax imposed on the full value of bus tickets sold to
passengers traveling between two points in New York, even though
nearly half of the mileage of the trips occurred in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, making the taxpayers’ receipts from these trips also
taxable by other states.38 And in Gwin, White & Prince, the Court
invalidated a gross receipts tax that Washington had imposed on a fruit
distributor on the full value of its sales to out-of-state customers,
revenue that “other states to which the commerce extends may, with
equal right, lay a tax.”39 It therefore exposed multistate taxpayers to
“the risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce is not ex–
posed.”40
True enough, the measure of each of these taxes was the taxpayer’s
gross receipts—that is, the taxpayer’s revenue without any allowance
for the expenses incurred in earning that revenue. But nothing in the
rationales of the decisions suggested that this “multiple taxation
31.

Id. at 255–56 (citations omitted).

32.

304 U.S. 307, 314 (1938).

33.

Id. at 311.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

305 U.S. 434 (1939).

37.

334 U.S. 653 (1948).

38.

Id. at 660.

39.

Gwin, White & Prince, 305 U.S. at 439.

40.

Id.
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doctrine” depended on the type of tax imposed. And the Court has
subsequently applied the doctrine to state taxes more generally, without
regard to the species of tax at issue. For example, in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes,41 the Court evaluated whether Vermont’s
corporate income tax impermissibly subjected the taxpayer’s dividend
income to multiple taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause.42 In
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines,43 the Court assessed
whether Oklahoma’s imposition of its retail sales tax on bus tickets for
travel from a point inside Oklahoma to a destination outside the state
“violated the prohibition against multiple taxation.”44 And just five
years ago, in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, the
Court repeatedly invoked “the threat of double taxation” in invali–
dating a provision of Maryland’s personal income tax.45
This “prohibition on multiple taxation” is well enough instantiated
in state and local tax law that the leading treatise in the field, Professor
Hellerstein’s State Taxation (which some people call the “state tax
bible”46) contains a section entitled “The Multiple Taxation Doctrine.”47
And though in another section of the treatise Professor Hellerstein
concedes that the Constitution “does not” always forbid the “double
taxation of income,”48 in this section he proclaims that the Supreme
Court’s “recent decisions have put the matter to rest,” firmly estab–
lishing “that the risk, and not just the actuality, of multiple taxation
suffices to establish a constitutional violation.”49
41.

445 U.S. 425 (1980).

42.

Id. at 436.

43.

514 U.S. 175 (1995).

44.

Id. at 182.

45.

135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798 (2015).

46.

Michael S. Greve, The Dormant Coordination Clause, 67 Vand. L. Rev.
En Banc 269, 271 (2014).

47.

State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 4.09[1].

48.

Id. ¶ 6.04. (“This is not to suggest, however, that the Constitution always
forbids double taxation of income. In fact, it does not.”). Professor Hellerstein
draws a distinction between tax schemes that create a “risk of multiple
taxation” that is “adventitious”—such as through the happenstance of
inconsistent division-of-income rules—and those “where the risk of multiple
taxation [is] inexorable,” such as when there is a “conflict between one state’s
residence-based rules and another state’s source-based rules.” Deciphering
Wynne, supra note 7, at 11. In his view, the former is constitutional, while
the latter is not. In my view, for reasons addressed infra, this concession that
some multiple taxation is constitutional reveals that multiple taxation itself
cannot be the constitutional problem. See infra note 130 and accompanying
text.

49.

State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 4.09[1][a]; see also Dan T. Coenen, Why
Wynne Should Win, 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 217, 217 (2014) (quoting
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B.

The permissibility of multiple taxation

Given the weight of this authority, the matter would appear cut
and dried: state income taxes subjecting multistate taxpayers to the
risk of multiple taxation would seem to violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, full stop. But the reality is more complicated. As it turns out,
state income tax schemes that expose taxpayers engaged in interstate
commerce to multiple taxation are often perfectly constitutional.
1.

Multiple taxation through the application of inconsistent
division-of-income rules

To understand why tax schemes that produce multiple taxation are
often constitutionally permissible, it is important to start with the
foundations of states’ authority to tax income. Though the Constitution
greatly strengthened the national government relative to that which
existed under the Articles of Confederation, it preserved state govern–
ments as “independent sovereigns.”50 And an indispensable aspect of
that sovereignty is the power to raise revenue through the imposition
of taxes. The Constitution places constraints on that power, but states
could hardly exist as independent governments without the authority
to tax. As Chief Justice Marshall explained in the great case of
McCulloch v. Maryland,51 “the power of taxing the people and their
property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be
legitimately exercised [by the states] on the objects to which it is
applicable, to the utmost extent to which the government may choose

J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938)) (asserting that a
state tax that “exposes interstate income earners to overlapping income
taxation . . . violates a cardinal principle of dormant Commerce Clause law,
‘forbidding’ state laws that expose interstate commerce ‘to the risk of a
double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed.’”); Brannon
P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Wins One: Five Takes on
Wynne and Direct Marketing Association, 100 Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes
103, 109–10 (2016) (asserting that the dormant Commerce Clause “has long
protected the income earned in interstate commerce from double taxation”);
Brief of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No.
13–485), 2014 WL 4895274 (co-authored by Professor Hellerstein) (“[T]he
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state taxing scheme that exposes
taxpayers to multiple state taxation on income earned in interstate
commerce, thereby placing an undue burden on interstate commerce.”); id.
(“[T]his Court’s jurisprudence clearly demonstrates that the risk of multiple
taxation—regardless of on what individual or what entity the risk falls—is
forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
50.

See Nathaniel Chipman, Principles of Government: A Treatise
on Free Institutions including the Constitution of the United
States 266 (2000).

51.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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to carry it.”52 Moreover, as Marshall continued, this “power of taxation
is not confined to the people and property [domiciled in] a state,” but
“may be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction.”53
In the early 1900s, as states began adopting the first modern state
income taxes, the Supreme Court cited these passages from McCulloch
in recognizing states’ authority to require “contributions from those
who realize current pecuniary benefits under the protection of the
government.”54 By this, the Court meant that states could tax income
“where it is earned,” regardless of where the earner of that income
resides.55 As the Court explained in Shaffer v. Carter:
[J]ust as a State may impose general income taxes upon its own
citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its control, it
may . . . levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous in
its effect, upon incomes accruing to non-residents from their
property or business within the State, or their occupations carried
on therein . . . .56

The justification for this “source-based” jurisdiction is plain
enough. If the state provides a market, of which the taxpayer avails
itself to earn income, then the state is entitled to ask for a contribution
to the public fisc in return.57 Or, from a more territorial perspective,
income generated within a given state’s boundaries lies within that
state’s geographic jurisdiction, wholly independent of who earned that
income. In this way, a state’s source-based jurisdiction to tax income is
analogous to specific (or case-linked) adjudicative jurisdiction. When a
defendant has “minimum contacts” with a state—when it “purpose–
fully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within” that

52.

Id. at 428.

53.

Id. at 429.

54.

Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 51 (1920).

55.

Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368 (1939).

56.

Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 52.

57.

See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Wisc. Dep’t of Tax’n, 322 U.S. 435 (1944). There
the Court wrote that
[a] state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is
fairly attributable either to property located in the state or to
events or transactions which, occurring there, are subject to state
regulation and which are within the protection of the state and
entitled to the numerous other benefits which it confers.
Id. at 441–42. As the Supreme Court explained in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney
Co., the relevant “test is . . . whether the taxing power exerted by the state
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state.” 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).

130

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
The States’ Multiple Taxation of Personal Income

state58—that state’s courts may assert in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant.59 Specific adjudicative jurisdiction does not extend to all
possible claims against that defendant, however, but only to those
claims “arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts” in the
forum state.60 Similarly, a state’s source-based jurisdiction to tax the
income of nonresidents only extends to the income derived from the
taxpayer’s activities in the taxing state (i.e., the income reasonably
determined to have been earned within that state).
In exercising this source-based jurisdiction, a state must have some
rational basis for determining that the income it seeks to tax is indeed
attributable to activities that occurred within its borders.61 As the
Supreme Court has phrased it, “the income attributed to the State for
tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values connected to the
taxing State.’”62 But within this lenient boundary, states are free to
exercise their own, policy-informed discretion in determining where the
income of multistate taxpayers has been earned. The Constitution does
not mandate that these rules be uniform across states, or that they be
particularly precise. Rather, states “have wide latitude in the selection
of” division-of-income rules, and their determinations “will only be
disturbed when the taxpayer has proved by ‘clear and cogent evidence’
that the income attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate
proportions to the business transacted . . . in that State’ or has ‘led to
a grossly distorted result.’”63
Thus, one state might determine that, with respect to individual
taxpayers, their entire salary is earned in the state where their principal
place of employment is located, unless her performance of services

58.

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).

59.

See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–86 (2014); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 128 (2014).

60.

See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (2014).

61.

See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).

62.

Id. (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,
325). See also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 390 U.S. at 325 (stating that, in the
context of a property tax, “[a]ny formula” for the attribution of values
among states “must bear a rational relationship, both on its face and in its
application, to property values connected with the taxing State”).

63.

Moorman, 437 U.S. at 274 (citations omitted) (quoting Hans Rees’ Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931) and Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
390 U.S. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting)).
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elsewhere is for the convenience of her employer.64 But another state
might conclude that income is earned where the taxpayer is physically
located at the time of the income-earning activity, including those days
that she works from home purely for personal convenience.65 Likewise,
with respect to business enterprises, one state might use a formula for
apportioning a taxpayer’s income among the states in which it operates,
taking account of where its sales, property, and employees are located.
By contrast, another state might divide the income of multistate
taxpayers purely on the basis of its proportion of sales revenue in the
states in which it operates. Or one state might deem a taxpayer’s
investment income to be earned entirely in her state of domicile, while
another might define it to have been earned where those investments
are actively managed. These are just a few examples; the possibilities
for inconsistency are nearly limitless.
Importantly, this divergence in income-attribution rules, as a
practical matter, guarantees that some taxpayers engaged in interstate
commerce will be subjected to multiple taxation. Consider the facts of
Moorman Manufacturing v. Bair.66 Moorman was an agricultural feed
manufacturer whose manufacturing operations were located in Illinois.67
During the tax years in question, it made between 18 and 22% of its
sales to customers in Iowa.68 Moorman was required to pay income taxes
in both Illinois and Iowa.69 Illinois computed the amount of income that
a multistate taxpayer earned in the state by multiplying its total
income (wherever earned) by a three-factor formula that weighted
equally the proportion of the taxpayer’s property, payroll, and sales in
Illinois.70 Iowa, in contrast, multiplied a taxpayer’s total income by a
single-factor formula, taking into account only the proportion of the
taxpayer’s sales in the state.71
64.

See State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 20.05[4][e] (discussing the “convenience
of the employer” test for the attribution of nonresident individuals’ income,
and its use by New York).

65.

See Edward A. Zelinsky, New York’s Ill-Advised Taxation of Nonresidents
During COVID-19, Tax Notes State (May 25, 2020), at 1001, 1003 (quoting
Telecommuter COVID-19 Employer and Employee FAQ, N.J. Treasury
Div. Tax’n (May 26, 2020), https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/
covid19-payroll.shtml [https://perma.cc/W9FG-BMWN]) (discussing New
Jersey’s rule that “income is sourced based on where the service or employment
is performed on a day’s method of allocation”).

66.

437 U.S. 267 (1978).

67.

Id. at 269.

68.

Id. at 271 n.4.

69.

Id. at 268, 278.

70.

Id. at 270.

71.

Id. at 269.
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Due to the confluence of these inconsistent division-of-income rules,
Moorman—to a mathematical certainty—was subjected to multiple
taxation on the income it earned on the products it sold to Iowa
customers. Iowa taxed 100% of that income, while Illinois necessarily
taxed a substantial portion of it as well (due to the property and
employees located in Illinois who played a role in manufacturing those
products).72 As the Supreme Court had observed in a prior decision
interpreting the District of Columbia’s statute attributing corporate
income for tax purposes, “[t]he use of an apportionment formula based
wholly on the sales factor, in the context of general use of the threefactor approach, will ordinarily result in multiple taxation of corporate
net income.”73
The multiple-taxation problem created by Iowa’s scheme was even
plainer if one imagined a taxpayer whose workforce and manufacturing
operations were located entirely in Illinois, but which made all of its
sales in Iowa. Under those circumstances, Illinois would have taxed
66.7% of the taxpayer’s income (using its equally weighted, three-factor
formula). Meanwhile, Iowa would have taxed 100% of the taxpayer’s
income. Two-thirds of this hypothetical taxpayer’s income would have
been taxed twice due to the taxpayer’s doing business in both states.
By contrast, competitors who confined all of their activities to one state
(whether Illinois or Iowa) would have been taxed only once, on exactly
100% of their income. The disadvantage to interstate commerce seems
blatant.
Moorman thus argued that Iowa’s scheme violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.74 But the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the
claim: “Even assuming some overlap, we could not accept [Moorman’s]
argument that Iowa, rather than Illinois, was necessarily at fault in a
constitutional sense.”75 Though Moorman may well have been subjected
to duplicative taxation—a burden not borne by firms engaged in purely
intrastate commerce—that “disparity can only be the consequence of
the combined effect of the Iowa and Illinois statutes, and Iowa is not
responsible for the latter.”76 Contrary to the taxpayer’s contention, the
Commerce Clause does not “prohibit[] any overlap in the computation
of taxable income by the States.”77 Rather, “some risk of duplicative
taxation exists whenever the States in which a corporation does

72.

Id. at 266–67.

73.

Gen. Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 559 (1965).

74.

Moorman, 437 U.S. at 276.

75.

Id. at 277.

76.

Id. at 277 n.12.

77.

Id. at 278.
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business do not follow identical rules for the division of income.”78 And
the Constitution “is neutral with respect to the content of any uniform
rule.”79
Moorman thus stands for the important proposition that the dup–
licative taxation of a multistate taxpayer’s income—at least when it
stems from the interplay of states’ inconsistent income-attribution
rules—does not violate the Commerce Clause. The double taxation of
income, at least under some circumstances, can be fully consistent with
the Constitution, even when it only affects those taxpayers who earn
income across state lines.
2.

Multiple taxation through the overlap of states’ different
jurisdictional bases for imposing income taxes

In addition to having the jurisdiction to tax income earned within
their borders, states are separately entitled to tax the entire incomes of
their residents, no matter where the income is earned. “Enjoyment of
the privileges of residence . . . and the attendant right to invoke the
protection of its laws,” the Supreme Court has explained, “are
inseparable from the responsibility for sharing the costs of govern–
ment.”80 Thus, it has been “universally recognized” for more than eighty
years that “the receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a
taxing sovereignty is a taxable event.”81 “Domicil itself” grants states
“a basis for such taxation.”82
The justification for this residence-based jurisdiction stems from the
special relationship a state shares with its residents.83 States provide
residents with a wide variety of public services, the staples of the
modern welfare state: public schools and universities, health insurance,
anti-poverty programs, unemployment insurance, state parks, vehicle
licensing, and the like. These benefits are quite expensive (at least in
the aggregate), and most are available exclusively to a state’s residents.
Moreover, though U.S. citizens can choose their state of residence,
states confer on their residents the privileges of state citizenship, which
include, most notably, rights of political participation (such as to vote
and hold public office). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, states
provide their residents with the basic elements of civil society—a
functioning judicial system, police and fire protection, and the enforce–
78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 279.

80.

New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937).

81.

Id. at 312–13.

82.

Id. at 313.

83.

Id. (“A tax measured by the net income of residents is an equitable method
of distributing the burdens of government among those who are privileged
to enjoy its benefits.”).
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ment of the state’s criminal and civil laws—that enable inhabitants to
enjoy the fruits of their labor. As the Court explained in Lawrence v.
State Tax Commission,84 residence-based income taxation is “founded
upon the protection afforded to the recipient of the income by the state,
in his person, in his right to receive the income, and in his enjoyment
of it when received,” which “are rights and privileges incident to his
domicile in the state.”85
No matter the precise justification, the principle that states’
sovereign powers include this jurisdiction to tax the entirety of a
resident’s income is well established and deeply rooted in the reserved
powers of the states.86 And it necessarily overlaps with other states’
jurisdiction to tax any income earned within their borders. If a resident
of State A earns income in State B, both states possess the authority
to tax that same increment of income: State A on the basis of residence,
and State B on the basis of source. Absent one state extending a credit
to the taxpayer for taxes paid to the other state (or exempting the
income at issue from taxation), the risk of multiple taxation is
unavoidable.87
Presently, the near-universal practice among states imposing per–
sonal income taxes is to protect their residents from this risk of multiple
taxation by affording them a credit for taxes paid to other states on
income earned in those states.88 But many observers—including the
field’s leading lights—have gone further and asserted that, when this
overlap of source- and residence-based taxation subjects a taxpayer to
duplicative burdens, the Constitution requires the state of residence to
cede its authority to the state of source, so as to prevent the consequent
burden on interstate commerce. Professor Hellerstein has written that
“[w]hen both the state of residence and the state of source have a
legitimate claim to tax income, there are widespread understandings
84.

286 U.S. 276 (1932).

85.

Id. at 281.

86.

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995) (“[A
state] may tax all the income of its residents, even income earned outside
the taxing jurisdiction.”); Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 7.

87.

See Walter Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a
Nonresident’s Personal Income, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1309, 1310 (1974).

88.

See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801
(2015); State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 20.10. Many states have also
entered into reciprocal exemption agreements, under which the state of
source abstains from taxing nonresidents’ income (so long as the taxpayer
is a resident of a state that provides an identical exemption for residents of
the taxing state). See id. ¶ 20.10[6]. Just like credits, these reciprocal
exemptions protect taxpayers earning income in states other than where
they reside from duplicative tax burdens, with the difference being that the
tax collected on income earned out-of-state flows to the state of residence
rather than the state of source. Id.
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that the state of residence ordinarily yields to the state of source to
avoid double taxation.”89 In his view, the Supreme Court has, “in accord
with the widespread understanding that the state of source has the
stronger tax claim, consistently interpreted the dormant Commerce
Clause as requiring the state of residence to yield to the state of source
whenever allowing both claims to prevail would result in multiple
taxation of interstate commerce.”90 Likewise, Professor Denning has
asserted that permitting “domiciliary states [to] tax 100% of their
residents’ income with no credit for taxes paid in other jurisdictions”
would remove an “important constitutional safeguard . . . clearly
advantag[ing] intrastate income over that earned elsewhere.”91 And
Professor Coenen has argued that “when the state in which income has
its source exercises its taxing power, the state of residence must in some
way yield, thus ensuring that double taxation of income earned outside
its borders does not occur.”92
There is support for this position in a handful of Supreme Court
decisions.93 Consider Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,94 which involved an ad
valorem property tax that Ohio had imposed on the full value of boats
and barges used to transport oil on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers.95
89.

Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 7; see also John A. Swain & Walter
Hellerstein, State Jurisdiction to Tax “Nowhere” Income, 33 Va. Tax Rev.
209, 223 (2013) (“Under the Commerce Clause, a state’s power to tax income
from interstate commerce on a residence basis is limited by other states’
power to tax the same income on a source basis insofar as is necessary to
avoid the risk of multiple taxation that the Commerce Clause generally
prohibits.”).

90.

Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 8. As Professor Hellerstein explains,
“the logic underlying this rule is irrefutable: if a taxpayer is taxable in more
than one state, a state’s insistence on the right to tax 100 percent of the
taxpayer’s income would expose the taxpayer to an unconstitutional risk of
multiple taxation.” State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 20.04[1][a]; see also
Brief of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 3, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S.
Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13–485), 2014 WL 4895274 (“When the risk of multiple
taxation of the same income arises because of conflicting taxation claims
made by the state where the taxpayer resides and the state where the
income is earned, the dormant Commerce Clause requires that the former
must yield to the latter.”).

91.

Denning, supra note 49, at 110; see also Brannon P. Denning & Norman R.
Williams, Wynne: Lose or Draw?, 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 245, 263
(2014) (“As to the practical problem of priorities, we think that the general
rule followed by many states is a workable and sensible one: the domiciliary
state should give a credit to taxes paid on income earned elsewhere.”).

92.

Coenen, supra note 49, at 220.

93.

See Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 7–9.

94.

342 U.S. 382 (1952).

95.

Id. at 382–83.
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Because Ohio was the taxpayer’s state of domicile (and thus where the
vessels were registered), Ohio asserted the authority to tax 100% of
their value.96 But because the boats and barges spent most of their time
traveling in the waters of other states, those other states had the
constitutional authority to impose fairly apportioned property taxes on
them as well (based on the proportion of their use within those other
states).97 The Court thus invalidated Ohio’s attempt to tax the vessels’
full value, reasoning that “[t]he rule which permits taxation by two or
more states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the
property by the state of the domicile.”98 “Otherwise,” said the Court,
“there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations.”99
Or consider Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Taxation,100 in which
the Court addressed Vermont’s tax on a nonresident corporation’s
dividend income. Mobil challenged the tax on several grounds, one of
which was that, because its state of residence (New York) could tax
100% of its dividend income, Vermont’s tax subjected its “dividend
income to a substantial risk of multiple taxation.”101 The Court rejected
the taxpayer’s claim, holding that “there is no reason in theory why”
the state of residence’s power to tax the taxpayer’s dividend income
“should be exclusive when the dividends reflect income from a unitary
business, part of which is conducted in other States.”102 And in so
holding, the Court reasoned that “[t]axation by apportionment and
taxation by allocation to a single situs are theoretically incommen–
surate,” such that if one is “constitutionally preferred,” the other would
be impermissible.103
On reflection, though, the notion that the Constitution contains a
“rule of priority”—a rule requiring the state of residence to yield to the
state of source when both seek to tax the same income of an
96.

Id. at 383.

97.

Id. at 383–84.

98.

Id. at 384.

99.

Id. at 385.

100. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
101. Id. at 442.
102. Id. at 445–46.
103. Id. at 444–45; see also Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 447 (1979) (“The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on
an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state
of the domicile. . . . Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate
operations.” (quoting Standard Oil, 342 U.S. at 384–85)); Central R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 612 (1962) (“[M]ultiple taxation is possible . . . if
there exists some jurisdiction, in addition to the domicile of the taxpayer,
which may constitutionally impose an ad valorem tax.”); id. (“‘multiple
taxation of interstate operations’ . . . offends the Commerce Clause.” (quoting
Standard Oil, 342 U.S. at 385)).
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individual—does not bear scrutiny. Though a handful of Supreme Court
opinions seem to support its viability, and though it reflects present
practice, such a requirement as a rule of constitutional law conflicts
with basic principles that are deeply embedded in our constitutional
fabric.
First, interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause as mandating
that the state of residence cede its authority to tax its residents’
incomes when other states tax the same income would render states’
reserved, sovereign power to tax their residents on all of their income a
hollow shell (if not entirely a dead letter). Again, states independently
possess the source-based jurisdiction to tax the income that their
residents earn inside the state. For example, California need not rely
on residence-based jurisdiction to tax the income that Californians earn
in California; it can already tax that income on the ground of being the
state of its source. As a result, a state’s power to tax individuals’ income
on the basis of residence only matters when taxing the income that its
residents earn outside the state.
Forcing the state of residence to yield to the state of source would
make this power largely inconsequential. It would mean that the state
of residence could only tax the out-of-state income of its residents when
that income was not taxed by the state in which it was earned (or taxed
by those states at a lower rate, in which case the state of residence
could capture the difference). Given that the forty-one states with
broad-based personal income taxes104 generally reach the income earned
by nonresidents within their borders, states would be forbidden from
exercising their residence-based jurisdiction except to collect a
vanishingly small sliver of their personal income tax revenue.
Second, a rule requiring residence-based taxation to yield to sourcebased taxation would create an odd disconnect between how the
Constitution treats the provision of state benefits, on the one hand, and
the financing of those benefits, on the other. Again, states provide a
wide variety of expensive public goods and services, from education to
emergency supplemental income to testing for COVID-19. The Supreme
Court has long understood the Constitution—despite its many
prohibitions on state discrimination against out-of-staters—as permitt–
ing states to provide these benefits exclusively to their own residents.
For instance, in Martinez v. Bynum105 the Court upheld a Texas statute
limiting the provision of free primary and secondary education to bona
fide state residents:

104. Individual Income Taxes, Urb. Inst.: State and Loc. Fin. Initiative,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-andlocal-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/individualincome-taxes [https://perma.cc/RGS4-P7VY] (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
105. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
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A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and
uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state interest in
assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only
by residents. Such a requirement with respect to attendance in
public free schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not burden or penalize the
constitutional right of interstate travel, for any person is free to
move to a State and to establish residence there. A bona fide
residence requirement simply requires that the person does
establish residence before demanding the services that are
restricted to residents.106

Likewise, in Vlandis v. Kline107 the Court “fully recognize[d] that a
State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality
of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide
residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.”108
The essential justification for sustaining the constitutionality of this
sort of state favoritism for residents is that, in the words of the Court,
it permits states to limit the “benefits generated by a state program to
those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to
serve,” whether those benefits are “the enjoyment of state educational
institutions, energy generated by a state-run plant, police and fire
protection, [or] agricultural improvement and business development
programs.”109 The Constitution allows states to discriminate in favor of
their own residents in the provision of these benefits precisely because
they are the ones who pay for them.
But if the state of residence were required to yield to the state of
source in the collection of personal income taxes, states would be, to a
significant degree, constitutionally forbidden from making this justifi–
106. Id. at 328–29 (footnotes omitted).
107. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
108. Id. at 452–53; see also Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (affirming
summarily a lower court judgment permitting Minnesota to require students
at the University of Minnesota to reside in the state for at least a year before
qualifying for the lower in-state tuition rate).
109. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) (emphasis added). This
constitutional permission for states to limit the provision of these benefits to
its own residents makes a good deal of practical sense. Without the capacity
to capture the value of these public goods, it would be financially
impracticable for states to offer the benefits its residents desired—and were
willing to finance with their taxes—if they were required to offer them on
equal terms to residents and nonresidents alike. Nonresidents would be able
to free ride on the generosity of other states, making states’ investment in
these goods and services cost-ineffective. Thus, even in states where the
population were willing to support the provision of such goods and services
with higher taxes, the inability to reap the fruit of such investments would
deter states from providing them. The ultimate result would be a substantial
underproduction of state-provided goods and services.
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cation a reality. States that depend on personal income taxes to finance
a substantial portion of their budgets (all but nine) would be prohibited
from requiring a sizeable percentage of their residents from contributing
equally to the cost of these public services.
As an example, consider an Oregon taxpayer with an adjusted gross
income of $2 million who earns all of that income in another state (say,
as an employee performing her services at an office in San Francisco).
California would tax the entirety of her income, at a rate higher than
Oregon would impose. Thus, were Oregon constitutionally required to
afford this resident a credit for the tax she paid California, Oregon
would be constitutionally prohibited from collecting any personal
income taxes from her. And this would be so no matter how many
children the taxpayer enrolled in Oregon public schools, or how valuable
Oregon fire and police protection were to the protection of her real and
personal property located in Oregon. Meanwhile, an Oregon resident
who earned her entire $75,000 income within Oregon would pay a
substantial sum in Oregon income taxes, even if she had no school-age
children.
In other words, the very rationale for the states’ constitutional
permission to discriminate against nonresidents in the provision of most
public benefits—namely, because their residents are the ones “who fund
the state treasury”110—would be largely nullified, at least with respect
to those residents earning income outside the state.
To be sure, states already accept this asymmetry as a matter of
policy choice; the near-universal practice among states is to offer a
credit to resident taxpayers for taxes paid to other states on the same
income.111 But it is one thing for states to exercise their policy discretion
to shield their residents from duplicative state-level tax burdens. It is
quite another for the Constitution to mandate this course. As a matter
of constitutional doctrine, it would be quite strange to read the
Commerce Clause as largely forbidding a practice that is presupposed
by (and forms the basis for) another significant, related constitutional
principle.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a “rule of priority”—which
would make the constitutionality of one state’s tax dependent on the
laws of other states—would run contrary to how the Constitution’s
federalism-based limitations on the states are conceptualized and
enforced. The Constitution contains a number of structural, unionpreserving provisions that constrain the centrifugal tendencies of the
states so as to protect the interests of the Nation as a whole. One is the
dormant Commerce Clause; others include the intergovernmental
immunity doctrine, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1792 (2015) (stating that “most other states,” unlike Maryland, offer a “full
credit against the income taxes that [residents] pay to other States”).
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the doctrine of preemption. With
respect to each of these important aspects of our constitutional
architecture, the constitutionality of a challenged state law generally
does not depend on the content of any other state’s laws. Instead, the
provisions are assessed in isolation, measured by themselves against the
demands of the Constitution.
Consider some recent examples. Whether Alabama violated the
Full Faith and Credit Clause when its Supreme Court refused to credit
a Georgia trial court’s judgment recognizing an adoption did not
depend on the content of any other state’s laws (other than as necessary
to determine the validity of the Georgia judgment).112 Whether
Virginia’s law restricting the availability of state Freedom of
Information Act requests to Virginia to “citizens of the Common–
wealth” violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV did
not depend on any other state’s rules regarding such requests.113 And
no other state’s law mattered in deciding whether California’s rule
forbidding class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts was
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (as dictated by the Supre–
macy Clause).114
To be sure, there are a handful of (relatively old) dormant
Commerce Clause cases involving state regulations in which the Court
has examined the challenged state law’s interaction with other states’
laws in determining whether they imposed an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce. For example, in the 1945 decision of Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,115 the Court invalidated an
Arizona law limiting the length of trains moving through the state, in
part on the ground that its inconsistency with surrounding states’ laws
impeded the flow of train traffic.116 And in the 1959 decision of Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,117 the Court struck down an idiosyncratic
Illinois law requiring all commercial trucks operating in the state to be
fitted with a particular type of contoured mudguard, in part due to the
requirement’s incompatibility with the laws of other states.118
Assuming these cases (and their interpretive methodology) remain
good law—and that they extend beyond the particular context of state
regulations governing the physical instrumentalities of interstate
commerce—the Supreme Court has specifically and repeatedly rejected
112. See generally V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016).
113. See generally McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013).
114. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
115. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
116. Id. at 774–75.
117. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
118. Id. at 529–30.
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the consideration of other states’ laws when assessing whether a state
tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As discussed earlier, the
Court in Moorman only asked whether Iowa’s method of apportioning
the income of multistate taxpayers was reasonable, refusing to consider
how Iowa’s method interacted with that of Illinois (or that Iowa’s
method was, at the time, decidedly unusual).119 More pointedly, the
Court declared in Mobil Oil that “the constitutionality of a [state’s] tax
should not depend on the vagaries of [another state’s] tax policy.”120 As
the Court explained much longer ago in Freeman v. Hewit,121 “[t]he
immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing
power of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical
affairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various
States at a particular moment.”122
But an understanding of the Commerce Clause that required the
state of residence to yield to the state of source in instances of
overlapping taxation would create precisely that sort of dependence.
Suppose Minnesota imposed an income tax on the entirety of its
residents’ incomes and offered no credit for taxes paid on that same
income to other states. The constitutionality of Minnesota’s tax, at
least as applied to Minnesotans with out-of-state income, would depend
on whether other states also taxed the income of Minnesotans; it would
turn on the “shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States.”123
Fourth and finally, to the extent it matters, neither Standard Oil
nor Mobil Oil really stand for the principle that the state of residence
must yield to the state of source in instances of duplicative personal
income taxes. First, the Court’s statement in Mobil Oil was purely
contingent: the Court stated that if the Constitution preferred either
the division of income among multiple states or the allocation of that
income to one state, then one would need to yield, as the two methods
of taxing income are “theoretically incommensurate.”124 But the Court
119. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276–81 (1978).
120. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 444 (1980).
121. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
122. Id. at 256; see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644–45 (1984)
(justifying the Court’s holding on the ground that “[a]ny other rule would
mean that the constitutionality of West Virginia’s tax laws would depend
on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that
the validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the
particular other States in which it operated”); Adam B. Thimmesch,
Comptroller v. Wynne and the Futile Search for Non-Discriminatory State
Taxation, 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 283, 294 (2014) (explaining that
“the Court has historically evaluated taxes’ impacts on interstate commerce
in isolation”).
123. Armco, 467 U.S. at 645.
124. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 444–45.
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did not address, let alone resolve, whether one of these methods is, in
fact, constitutionally preferred. Second, Standard Oil concerned the
constitutionality of a property tax, not an income tax.125 And it may
well be that the states’ authority to tax their residents on all of their
income due to their residency does not translate to the context of
property taxes. (Certainly, a taxpayer cannot enjoy all of her property,
wherever that property is physically located, in her state of residence,
the same way she can her income.) “Domicil alone” may not justify a
state’s taxation of all of a resident’s property.126
In all events, the idea that the dormant Commerce Clause precludes
the state of residence from taxing income over which it plainly possesses
jurisdiction—on the ground that another state has chosen to tax the
same income—runs counter to how federalism works in our cons–
titutional system. The Constitution does not rank one species of a
state’s jurisdiction as stronger than another. Source and residence are
simply alternative bases on which states are constitutionally empowered
to tax income, in the exercise of their authority as independent
sovereigns.127
Again, we can analogize to a state’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a
lawsuit. Often, multiple states will have the constitutional authority
(through their courts) to exercise personal jurisdiction over the litigants
in a given lawsuit. State A might have specific jurisdiction because the
events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim occurred there, while State B
might have general jurisdiction on the ground of being the defendant’s
state of domicile. But neither State A nor State B would have any sort
of jurisdictional “priority” to try the case. In a constitutional sense,
both states would be equally authorized to adjudicate the dispute.
Of course, the fact that a state has jurisdiction to impose an income
tax hardly guarantees that the tax is constitutional. State income taxes
must still consist with the dormant Commerce Clause, just as they must
abide other constitutional constraints, such as those contained in the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. But the dormant
125. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 383 (1952).
126. See, e.g., id. at 384 (“The rule which permits taxation by two or more states
on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the
state of the domicile.”).
127. As Professor Greve has explained:
Why should [a state’s] right to tax its own citizens hinge on what
other states have done or may want to do? In determining how to
order rival, legitimate claims on the same tax base, why should
nonresident states get to go first? And isn’t the states’ autonomy
to configure their own tax base the embodiment of a “retained”
power that should be beyond federal control and preemption,
including the Supreme Court’s control?
Greve, supra note 46, at 278.
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Commerce Clause forbids state laws that discriminate against or unduly
burden interstate commerce.128 And whether a state tax transgresses
these limitations is determined by examining the law itself, without
regard to its interaction with any other state’s laws.
Thus, the Constitution’s architecture of federalism—in endowing
the states with the authority to tax income on the basis of both source
and residence and granting neither precedence in such taxation—fully
contemplates the existence of multiple taxation. This is true even when
the taxpayers who are exposed to multiple taxation are engaged in
interstate commerce, and those engaged in purely intrastate commerce
are immune.
In short, the proposition that “the dormant Commerce Clause
forbids state taxes that expose interstate commerce to a risk of multiple
taxation” just does not hold true.129

II. The Role of Multiple Taxation in
Constitutional Analysis
Stated simply, the Constitution does not prohibit state income
taxes because they expose taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce to
duplicative tax burdens. But that does not mean that the existence of
multiple taxation tells us nothing. The Constitution imposes two basic
structural constraints on states in their taxation of income: (1) they
cannot tax income that lies beyond their lawful jurisdiction, and (2)
they cannot discriminate against interstate commerce.130 When a state
128. As explained in more detail below, see infra note 133, the Supreme Court
generally has not applied the “undue burden” portion of this test to state
taxes, at least in the last fifty years (though it has, on two occasions, applied
it to tax collection obligations—though those are better understood as
regulations than as taxes). Thus, it is probably fair to say that, under
present law, the dormant Commerce Clause only demands that state taxes
not discriminate against interstate commerce.
129. Cf. Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Dual Residents: A Sur-Reply to
Zelinsky, State Tax Notes, Jan. 15, 2018, at 269, 271 (noting that “the
dormant commerce clause does not per se forbid double taxation”).
130. Since 1977, the Supreme Court has often (though not always) applied a
four-part test—first articulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977)—to determine whether a state or local tax violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of
Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial Taxation, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 149, 153–54, 153 n.21 (2002) (listing the decisions). The
“Complete Auto test” asks whether (1) “the tax is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing state,” (2) “is fairly apportioned,”
(3) “does not discriminate against interstate commerce,” and (4) “is fairly
related to the services provided.” Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. As I have
attempted to explain elsewhere, the four parts of this test effectively amount
to a more detailed operationalizing of the fundamental limits on a state’s
taxing authority: that the state have jurisdiction over whatever it seeks to
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income tax runs afoul one of these prohibitions, it will often result in
duplicative taxation. But it is a tax’s transgression of one of these
foundational structural principles—and not the multiple taxation
itself—that creates the constitutional problem.
A.

The jurisdictional limits on a state’s power to tax income

Again, a state has the jurisdiction to tax income on two distinct
bases: that the income was earned by one of its residents, and that the
income was earned within its borders. When a state seeks to tax income
falling outside either of these parameters, it violates the Constitution.
The constitutional problem is no different than when a state court
attempts to adjudicate a lawsuit against a defendant over which it lacks
in personam jurisdiction, or when a state seeks to regulate activity
occurring elsewhere, and thus legislates extraterritorially.
Courts and commentators have tended to locate these jurisdictional
limits on state taxing authority within the Due Process Clause, which
the Supreme Court has described as containing protections pertaining
to both fundamental fairness and the territorial limits of a state’s
rightful authority.131 These jurisdictional boundaries might also reflect
structural principles inherent in the federal system created by the
Constitution, independent of any specific textual provisions.132 In either
event, these constraints on a state’s taxing power are well established
and uncontroversial.
When a state exceeds its lawful jurisdiction in taxing income,
multiple taxation will often result. For example, suppose California
imposed an income tax on a Nevada resident. California’s only jurisdic–
tional basis for imposing the exaction would be that the taxpayer had
earned that income in California. But suppose California’s incomeattribution rules were unreasonable, and the taxpayer had clearly
earned the income in Oregon. If Oregon also imposed a tax on nontax, and that its tax not discriminate against interstate commerce. See
Joondeph, supra, at 154–61.
131. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in
a federal system”).
132. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819) (“All subjects
over which the sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation;
but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles,
exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced selfevident.”); Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 Va. Tax Rev. 109, 122–32
(2004) (arguing that state laws projecting their legislative powers to tax or
regulate beyond their borders are simply ultra vires, inconsistent with the
basic premises of the constitutional design, even when they do not deprive
any person of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause).
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residents for income earned within the state, it, too, would tax this
increment of income. The taxpayer would thus be taxed twice on the
income she earned in Oregon—once by California and once by Oregon.
(And this duplicative taxation would occur regardless of whether
Nevada additionally asserted its authority to tax that income on the
basis of residence.)
The taxpayer would be subject to multiple state-level taxation, and
California’s tax would be unconstitutional. But the multiple taxation
would not be what renders the California tax impermissible. Rather,
the constitutional problem would be that California has sought to tax
income over which it lacks jurisdiction: the income of a nonresident
that was not plausibly attributable to California.
Or suppose the same facts, but assume that Oregon did not tax the
income of nonresidents earned in Oregon. In that scenario, the taxpayer
would not be subject to multiple taxation; the income she earned in
Oregon would be taxed only once, by California. Yet California’s tax
would still be unconstitutional. It would still reach income over which
California lacked jurisdiction.
Thus, multiple taxation is really beside the point in identifying the
constitutional transgression, neither sufficient nor necessary. Multiple
taxation might be present, but the actual constitutional problem
concerns the jurisdictional boundaries that define the breadth of a
state’s taxing authority within our federal system.
B.

The prohibition on state taxes that discriminate
against interstate commerce

The other basic structural principle governing state income taxes is
that they may not discriminate against interstate commerce. This is
the essence of the proscription imposed by the dormant Commerce
Clause.133 Over and again, in literally hundreds of decisions, the

133. To be clear, black-letter law presently dictates that a state law will generally
violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it either discriminates against
interstate commerce or imposes an “undue burden” on interstate commerce.
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018). And a
burden on interstate commerce is considered “undue” when it is “clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
For a variety of reasons, I believe the distinct “undue burden” inquiry can be
disregarded in this context. First, as explained earlier, see supra note 130,
since 1977 the Supreme Court has generally applied the four-part Complete
Auto test for determining whether a state tax violates the dormant Commerce
Clause. That test, in different ways, examines the taxing state’s connection
to the value it seeks to tax (i.e., its jurisdiction) and whether the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce. The Complete Auto test has never
asked whether the burden that the state tax imposes on interstate commerce
is “undue.”
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Supreme Court has identified this anti-discrimination rule as the core
of the Commerce Clause’s constraint on state and local taxes and
regulations.134
As with taxes exceeding a state’s jurisdiction, taxes discriminating
against interstate commerce will often result in multiple taxation. For
example, suppose Illinois imposed a tax on income earned in Illinois,
but exempted its own residents from the tax, such that the only
taxpayers subject to the tax were those engaged in interstate commerce
(residing in another state and earning income in Illinois).135 And suppose
Indiana adopted a purely residence-based income tax, by which it taxed

Second, the Supreme Court has never actually applied the Pike “undue
burden” test—at least as a distinct requirement—in assessing the constit–
utionality of a state or local tax. Indeed, the only state tax cases where the
burden on interstate commerce (independent of any discrimination) seemed
relevant to the Court’s analysis were those involving enforcement obligations,
where the state had required out-of-state vendors to collect taxes on sales to
the state’s consumers. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992),
overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018); Nat’l
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). Thus, the relevant
issue in these cases did not actually concern whether the tax imposed an
undue burden, but instead whether the regulatory burden imposed on vendors
did so. In all events, the Supreme Court recently overruled both Quill and
Bellas Hess and held that such collection obligations, when imposed on
vendors that lack a physical presence in the taxing state, do not create an
undue burden on interstate commerce. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
Third, and more generally, the Supreme Court has largely allowed Pike’s
“undue burden” test to fall into desuetude. See Adam B. Thimmesch, The
Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 Temp. L. Rev. 331, 379 (2020)
(acknowledging “the reality that the Court has shown little interest in
engaging in Pike balancing or even shown faith in its ability to do so”). The
justices have not invalidated any state law on this basis since at least 1992,
and perhaps since 1988. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Bendix Autolite Corp.
v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988). Moreover, to the extent the
Court has used the undue burden test in the past fifty years to invalidate
laws under the dormant Commerce Clause, it has done so to strike down
provisions that regulated extraterritorially—a matter that really concerns a
state’s legislative jurisdiction. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 298; Bendix, 486 U.S. at
888; Brown-Forman Distilleries Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
Realistically, then, the present doctrinal test for assessing the constitutionality
of a state tax is that it must (1) fall within the state’s lawful taxing jurisdic–
tion, and (2) not discriminate against interstate commerce.
134. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794
(2015) (listing cases that establish the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce
clause anti-discrimination precedent).
135. For purposes of this example, I am assuming Illinois has not imposed a
similar tax exclusively on its residents, such that, when viewing its taxation
of residents and nonresidents as a whole, the scheme is nondiscriminatory.

147

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
The States’ Multiple Taxation of Personal Income

its residents on the entirety of their incomes, affording no credit for
taxes paid to other states on the same income.
An Indiana resident who commuted into Chicago for her job would
be taxed twice on her salary—once by Indiana (as the state of residence)
and once by Illinois (as the state of source). And Illinois’s tax would be
unconstitutional. But again, the constitutional problem would not be
the multiple taxation itself; it would be that the Illinois tax
discriminated against interstate commerce. By imposing its tax exclus–
ively on nonresidents, Illinois would be expressly favoring intrastate
over interstate commerce.
The insignificance of multiple taxation to the constitutional
question is even clearer if we suppose Indiana imposed no income tax.
On those facts, the taxpayer would not be subject to multiple taxation,
but the Illinois tax would still impermissibly discriminate against
interstate commerce. Or suppose Indiana adopted an income tax
scheme similar to what most states have today, whereby it imposed a
tax on the entirety of its residents’ incomes but offered them credits for
income taxes paid to other states. Again, our hypothetical taxpayer
would not be subject to multiple taxation, as she would be taxed on
her salary only by Illinois. But the Illinois tax would still be
unconstitutional.
In short, there are two basic structural constraints on the states’
taxation of income: they can only tax income within either their sourcebased or residence-based jurisdiction, and they cannot discriminate
against interstate commerce. A state income tax that violates one of
these principles will frequently subject taxpayers engaged in interstate
commerce to duplicative burdens. But the constitutional violation lies
in the transgression of one of these structural principles, not the fact
that the taxpayer has been exposed to multiple taxation.

III. Revisiting Wynne
Disentangling multiple taxation from the Constitution’s structural
constraints on a state’s power to tax income clarifies the analysis for
determining whether a state income tax is constitutionally permissible.
And in doing so, it answers an important question left unresolved by
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne.
At issue in Wynne was a discrete component of Maryland’s personal
income tax. Somewhat confusingly, Maryland’s state-level personal
income tax comprised two separate components: a state component
(retained entirely by the state) and a county component, which was
assessed and collected by the state (and thus was part of the state’s
income tax) but the revenue from which ultimately flowed to the
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taxpayer’s county of residence.136 Maryland imposed its personal income
tax on the entirety of a resident’s income, regardless of where that
income was earned.137 With respect to the state component, Maryland
granted its residents a credit for income taxes paid to other states on
the same income.138 But Maryland did not offer such a credit against
the county component, even if the taxpayer earned most of her income
in other states.139 Importantly, Maryland also imposed the county
component of the tax on nonresidents for the income they earned within
Maryland.140
Consequently, the county component of Maryland’s tax exposed
some Maryland residents—those earning out-of-state income taxed by
other states—to duplicative taxation: once by Maryland, and then
again by the state where the income was earned.141 The Wynnes were
Maryland residents who had earned much of their income in other
states.142 They argued that by exposing their income to multiple
taxation, the county component of Maryland’s scheme violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.143
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that the
county component of Maryland’s tax was unconstitutional.144 The ma–
jority began its analysis by discussing three decisions—J.D. Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,145 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford,146 and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey147—that
seem to stand for the proposition that any state tax that exposes a
taxpayer to the risk of multiple taxation violates the dormant

136. Id. at 1792.
137. Id.; see also Bradley W. Joondeph, Argument Preview: The Scope of the
States’ Constitutional Authority to Tax the Personal Income of Their
Residents, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 28, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.scotus
blog.com/2014/10/argument-preview-the-scope-of-the-states-constitutionalauthority-to-tax-the-personal-income-of-their-residents/ [https://perma.cc/Q
DR7-A2GZ].
138. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1793.
143. Id. at 1793–94.
144. Id. at 1803–06.
145. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
146. 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
147. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
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Commerce Clause.148 The Court noted, for instance, that in J.D. Adams
“the ‘vice of the statute’ was that it taxed, ‘without apportionment,
receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce,’” and thus
exposed multistate taxpayers “to the risk of a double tax burden to
which intrastate commerce is not exposed.”149 Likewise, the Court cited
Gwin, White & Prince as holding that a state tax violates the dormant
Commerce Clause when “it imposes upon [interstate commerce], merely
because interstate commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple burden
to which local commerce is not exposed.”150 These decisions, said the
Court, “all but dictate[d] the result” in Wynne151—insinuating that the
county component of Maryland’s tax was unconstitutional simply
because, without offering a credit for taxes paid to other states, it taxed
the entirety of its residents’ income—income that, for many taxpayers,
was also taxable by other states.152
But instead of ultimately relying on this risk-of-multiple-taxation
rationale, the Court’s opinion pivoted, homing in instead on how
Maryland’s scheme discriminated against interstate commerce.153 To
assess whether Maryland’s tax so discriminated, the Court deployed the
so-called “internal consistency test,” by which it asked whether, if every
state adopted the challenged tax scheme, interstate commerce would be
disadvantaged relative to intrastate commerce.154 Internal consistency
is valuable as a constitutional metric, said the Court, because it
distinguishes those tax schemes that are “inherently discriminatory”
from those where the disadvantage to interstate commerce is “simply
the result of its interaction with the taxing schemes of other States.”155
And in applying this test, the Court found it necessary to consider
148. See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 311; Gwin, White & Prince, 305 U.S.
at 439; Central Greyhound Lines, 334 U.S. at 662.
149. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (quoting J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 311).
150. Id. (quoting Gwin, White & Prince, 305 U.S. at 439).
151. Id. at 1794.
152. See Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 12 (remarking that J.D. Adams
Mfg. Co, Gwin, White & Prince, and Greyhound Lines “can be fairly read as
standing for the proposition that states that seek to tax 100% of a tax base
on an unapportioned basis must yield to states that can tax the same receipts
on some other plausible basis, whether or not the unapportioned taxes are
internally consistent.”); cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Comparing Wayfair and
Wynne: Lessons for the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 Chap.
L. Rev. 55, 66 (2019) (“Wynne indeed reflects a strong aversion to double
taxation.”).
153. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803–06; see also Darien Shanske, States Can and
Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law, 45 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.
543, 558 (2019).
154. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802–06; see also Joondeph, supra note 21.
155. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
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Maryland’s income tax scheme “as a whole.”156 This meant examining
the tax as imposed on both residents and nonresidents.157
Framed this way, the county component of Maryland’s tax was
internally inconsistent, and hence discriminatory.158 Had every state
adopted the same scheme, taxpayers who confined their income-earning
activities to a single state would be taxed only once, on precisely 100%
of their incomes.159 By contrast, any taxpayer who lived in one state
but earned income in another would be taxed on 100% of their income
by their state of residence, and then again by the state of source on the
income they earned outside the state.160 In this way, those taxpayers
engaged in economic activities crossing state lines would be syste–
matically disadvantaged relative to those confining their activities to
their state of residence. To the Court, this meant that “Maryland’s tax
scheme [was] inherently discriminatory,” and thus forbidden by the
dormant Commerce Clause.161
Justice Ginsburg authored the principal dissent, arguing vocifer–
ously that the Court had “veer[ed] from a principle of interstate and
international taxation repeatedly acknowledged by this Court: A nation
or State ‘may tax all the income of its residents, even income earned
outside the taxing jurisdiction.’”162 To her, the Court was really holding
that, “[i]n taxing personal income, . . . source-based authority, i.e.,
authority to tax commerce conducted within a State’s territory, boxes
in the taxing authority of a taxpayer’s domicile.”163 But the Consti–
tution entitles a state to tax the entirety of a resident’s income, argued
the dissent, regardless of what any other state might do.164 True enough,
most states afford their residents credits for taxes they pay to other
states when taxed on the same income. But they do so “as a matter of
tax ‘policy,’ . . . not because the Constitution compels that course.”165
In the dissenters’ view, “nothing in the Constitution or in prior
decisions of this Court dictates that one of two States, the domiciliary

156. Id. at 1803 n.8.
157. See id. at 1803–04.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1804.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Okla.
Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1814 (quoting Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 463 n.12).
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State or the source State, must recede simply because both have lawful
tax regimes reaching the same income.”166
In response, the majority asserted that the dissenters had over–
looked the critical distinction “between discriminatory tax schemes and
double taxation that results only from the interaction of two different
but nondiscriminatory tax schemes.”167 The Court’s holding rested not
on the fact that Maryland’s scheme produced double taxation per se,
but that the duplicative taxation at issue “discriminated in favor of
intrastate over interstate economic activity.”168
Critically, then, Wynne did not answer whether a nondiscrim–
inatory tax imposed by a state on all of the income of its residents,
without affording any credit for taxes paid to other states on the same
income, would violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Specifically, the
Court clarified that its opinion did not require Maryland to cure the
constitutional problem “by granting a credit for taxes paid to other
States;” its rationale did not “foreclose the possibility that it could
comply with the Commerce Clause in some other way.”169 Presumably,
as explained by the dissent, that “some other way” would have been by
repealing the application of the county component of the tax to
nonresidents.170 The Court therefore stopped short of establishing a
“rule of priority” that would require “a State taxing based on residence
to ‘recede’ to a State taxing based on source.”171
But a clear understanding of the constitutional significance (or
insignificance) of multiple taxation—as discussed at length in Parts I
and II—fully answers this question: A state can impose a nondiscrim–
inatory personal income tax on the entirety of its residents’ income,
even if it would subject taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce to
duplicative tax burdens from which taxpayers earning their incomes in
only one state would be shielded.
Despite the Court’s repeated references to Maryland’s scheme
resulting in the “double taxation of income earned out of state,”172 the
constitutional problem in Wynne was not that Maryland’s scheme
produced multiple taxation. One can see this by conceptualizing
Maryland’s tax, in alternate turns, according to the two possible
166. Id. at 1813; see also id. at 1813–14 (“[T]he Constitution does not prefer one
lawful basis for state taxation of a person’s income over the other. Nor does
it require one State, in this case Maryland, to limit its residence-based
taxation, should the State also choose to exercise, to the full extent, its
source-based authority.”).
167. Id. at 1804 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 1795.
169. Id. at 1806.
170. Id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1805 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at 1801.
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jurisdictional bases for its application of the county component of the
tax to its own residents. First, Maryland could have justified imposing
the tax on its own residents as an exercise of its residence-based
jurisdiction. Given the scope of this jurisdiction, this would have
authorized applying the tax to all of its residents’ income, wherever
earned. But if this explained the tax’s application to Maryland
residents, there was a constitutional problem in applying the tax to
nonresidents. Residence-based jurisdiction could not justify this part of
the tax; a tax on nonresidents could only be permissible as an exercise
of the state’s source-based jurisdiction. But if only nonresidents were
taxed on the basis of source—that is, if only nonresidents (and no
Marylanders) were taxed on the privilege of earning income in the
state—then this aspect of the tax was blatantly discriminatory: it
applied exclusively to nonresidents.
Alternatively, Maryland could have justified the application of the
county component of its tax to its residents as an exercise of its sourcebased jurisdiction. This would have solved the discrimination issue
described above, for on this understanding, all taxpayers (residents and
nonresidents alike) would have been taxed equally on the income they
earned within Maryland. But this conceptualization would have created
a different problem: Maryland would have needed to invoke its
residence-based jurisdiction to justify reaching the income that its
residents earned in other states. And this, too, would have been
blatantly discriminatory, for it would have meant that this residencebased tax (on the privilege of enjoying one’s income in Maryland) was
imposed exclusively on the income earned by Marylanders outside the
state; income earned within Maryland would have been exempt from
this residence-based tax on the receipt or enjoyment of income in the
state. Again, an aspect of the scheme would have plainly discriminated
against interstate commerce.
In other words, however one conceptualized Maryland’s deployment
of its taxing powers to justify the county component of the tax, the
scheme hit a constitutional snag. Considered as a whole, as applied to
both residents and nonresidents, its discrimination against interstate
commerce was inescapable.173
But the constitutional problem really had nothing to do with a
state’s authority to tax the entirety of its residents’ incomes without
protecting them from duplicative state-level taxation. Had Maryland
applied the county component of its income tax exclusively to its own
residents—based on its jurisdiction to tax the entirety of their
173. The Court’s “internal consistency” analysis captured the essence of this
problem, and thus led to the same result. Id. at 1803–06. The explanation
provided here draws out, perhaps in plainer terms, how Maryland’s scheme
necessarily discriminated against taxpayers whose income-earning activities
crossed state lines.
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incomes—the tax would have been perfectly constitutional.174 And this
would have been so even though Maryland taxpayers who engaged in
interstate commerce (like the Wynnes) would have been subjected to
substantial multiple taxation, while taxpayers who engaged in purely
intrastate commerce (earning their income entirely within Maryland)
would have been immune. The disadvantage to interstate commerce
under such a scheme would not have stemmed from any impermissible
discrimination against interstate commerce, but instead (in the Court’s
words in Wynne) from “the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes.”175

Conclusion
For the time being, the question of whether the Constitution
permits a state to tax all the income of its residents without protecting
them from multiple taxation (through credits or exemptions) is not
especially pressing. As discussed at oral argument in Wynne, Mary–
land’s personal income tax was the only such state-level scheme in the
country.176 Moreover, there does not seem to be much of a desire among
states to adopt such taxes in the near future. To make such schemes
non-discriminatory, states would need to forego taxing the income of
nonresidents earned within their borders or impose an evenhanded
source-based tax that stacked on top of the residence-based tax already
imposed on their residents (thus substantially increasing their marginal
rates).177 At the moment, neither option seems palatable.178
174. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the Court’s holding—finding that Maryland’s tax scheme violated the
dormant Commerce Clause because of its internal inconsistency—left
Maryland free to cure the constitutional problem by declining to impose the
county component of the income tax on nonresidents earning income in
Maryland).
175. Id. at 1802 (majority opinion).
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13–485), 2014 WL 7661629 at *32; see
State Taxation, supra note 7, ¶ 20.10 (“[E]very state with a broad-based
personal income tax provides a credit for taxes that their residents pay to
other states . . . .”).
177. For example, a state could impose a 6% tax on all the income of its residents,
wherever earned, and then an additional 3% tax on all income earned within
the state, which would be imposed on residents and nonresidents alike. The
state would then still collect personal income taxes from nonresidents, but
the aggregate rate imposed on its residents (9%) would be substantially
higher.
178. See Deciphering Wynne, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that this eventuality
“seems highly improbable in light of the reaction of voting residents to the
adoption of such a regime”).
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But several cities—including New York, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Kansas City, and St. Louis—presently impose these sorts of residencebased income taxes without offering full credits for taxes paid to other
states on the same income.179 And at the state level, the policy
calculations and political winds might shift. At some point, states could
find it important to distribute more equally the burdens of financing
the state-funded goods and services to which their residents are entitled
(and which they enjoy to the exclusion of nonresidents). States might
wish to allocate these costs based simply on their residents’ respective
incomes, independent of where those incomes were earned. Equity in
contributions to the public fisc might become a higher priority than
protecting residents from duplicative state-level income taxes, or than
taxing income earned in the state on the basis of source.180
The Constitution empowers states to make that choice. Though
strands of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be
pieced together to contend otherwise—and though the Court reserved
the question in Wynne—there should not be any doubt. Structural
principles deeply embedded in Constitution’s architecture of federalism
grant states the authority to tax the entirety of their residents’ income,
even when it exposes them to duplicative tax burdens. It is a
“constitutional power of taxation reserved to the state,”181 regardless of
what policies other states might pursue.

179. See Brief of the International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae
at 17–18, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787
(2015) (No. 13–485), 2013 WL 6115820, at *17–18; see also Deciphering
Wynne, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that, “[a]t the local level, . . . Wynne is
likely to have more of a practical impact” given the existence of these city
income tax schemes).
180. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276, 281 (1932).
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